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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic: BLOCKING ACCESS TO
ABORTION CLINICS IS NOT
VIOLATIVE OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS CONSPIRACY STATUTE.
In Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753
(1993), the United States Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that obstructing a woman's access to an abortion clinic does not give rise to a federal
cause of action under 42 U.S.c. §
1985(3) (1988). In so holding, the Court
concluded that the goal of preventing
abortions behind the demonstrations did
not establish an invidious discriminatory intent towards women in general,
and the incidental effect of the demonstrations on a woman's right to interstate travel was insufficient to establish
a conspiracy to deprive women of their
constitutionally protected right. Moreover, the Court concluded that preventing abortions did not constitute a purely
private conspiracy.
The Respondents (hereinafter
"Pro-Choice") were abortion clinics
and supporting organizations who
sought to protect a woman's right to
have an abortion. Petitioners (hereinafter "Operation Rescue") were Operation Rescue, an organization that
opposed abortion, and six individuals
who sought to protect the rights of the
unbom by staging anti-abortion demonstrations.
In the United States District
Court for the Eastem District of Virginia, Pro-Choice applied for a pennanent injunction to enjoin Operation Rescue from demonstrating and blocking
the entrances of abortion clinics. The
district court held that preventing a
woman who sought an abortion or other
abortion-related services from accessing an abortion clinic violated her constitutional right of interstate travel under 42 U.s.c. § 1985(3) (1988). In so
holding, the court granted the injunction and ruled in favor of Pro-Choice on
its state law claims of nuisance and
trespass. The Court of Appeals for the
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Fourth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The United States Supreme
Court began its analysis by reviewing
two previously adjudicated cases
wherein it established the required
elements of a § \985(3) private conspiracy claim. First, a plaintiff must
show "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [was] behind the conspirators' action." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at
758 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88,102 (1971». Second, the
private conspiracy must have been
"aimed at interfering with rights that
are protected against private, as well as
official encroaclunent." Bray, 113 S.
Ct. at 758 (citing Carpenters v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983».
As to the first element, the Court
noted that it had never before had occasion to define or set the parameters of
what constituted a "perhaps otherwise
class-based invidiously discriminatory
animus." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
Relying on the theory of stare decisis,
Pro-Choice asserted that the animus
behind the opposition to abortion was
analogous with the intent to discriminate against a particular class of individuals, such as racial discrimination.
The Court rejected such a correlation
and the perceived conclusion of the
district court that opposition to abortion was considered discrimination
against the "class" of women who
sought abortions. ld. The Court noted
whatever the exact meaning of "class"
was under Gr~[fin 's expansive definition, the tenn undoubtedly indicated
more than a class ofpeople who shared
in a desire to participate in conduct that
the § 1985(3) defendant disfavored. ld.
Moreover, the Court stated that simply
defining "class" as those who engaged
in conduct with which the defendant
interfered would permit an exorbitant
amount of plaintiffs to bring a federal
cause of action, and in essence, convert
§ \985(3) into a general federal tort
statute, something the animus requirement was implemented to prevent. ld.
The Court recognized, how-

ever, that Pro-Choice's argument was
not limited solely to women seeking
abortions, for Pro-Choice alleged that
class-based discrimination existed
against women in general. ld. The
Court declined to address whether
women in general was a qualifying
"class" under the Griffin definition
because Operation Rescue's actions
did not reflect an animus towards
women "because they are women." Id.
Rather, recognizing thatthe "animus"
requirement does not mandate a finding
of malicious motivation, the Court asserted that "at least a purpose that
focusses upon women by reason of
their sex" must be established. ld. Finding that even that minimal requirement
was not met, the Court stated the purpose behind the demonstrations was the
physical intervention between women
seeking abortions and the unbom victims, not women as a class. Id. at 760.
The Court after reaching the
aforementioned conclusion stated for
Pro-Choice to sustain its allegation that
a discriminatory intent existed against
women as a class, it must prove either: (1) that it could reasonably be
presumed that the opposition to abortion reflected a sex-based intent, or (2)
regardless of intent, that a class-based
animus could be detemlined solely by
the effect of the demonstrations. Id. at
760. The Court found neither proposition could be supported. Id.
Regarding the first proposition,
the Court noted that certain activities
incite great opposition, and if those
activities were targeted and undertaken
exclusively or predominantly by a specific class of individuals, an intent to
discriminate against that class could be
presumed. ld. The Court concluded,
however, it was illogical to presume
that the opposition to abortion was an
opposition towards women in general
because there are numerous common
and refined reasons for opposing abortion other than hatred towards women
as a class. Id. The Court found because
women and men are on both sides of the
abortion issue, abortion protests were
not divided along gender lines or geared

towards women as a class. Jd.
Holding that there was no sexbased intent behind the demonstrations,
the Court stated the success of ProChoice's claim rested with the second
proposition.ld. To succeed, the Court
stated, Pro-Choice had to show that
irrespective of Operation Rescue's intent, there in effect existed a discriminatory intent against women as a class
because abortion is an undertaking engaged in solely by women. Id. Citing
two previously adjudicated cases, the
Court held such a proposition was not
supportable. Jd.
In Geduldigv. Aiello, 417U.S.
484 (1974), the Court held that because
women only are able to bear children is
not conclusive that every legislative
classification concerning pregnancy was
asex-basedclassification.ld. TheCourt
reached a similar conclusion in Feeney
v. Personnel Administrator of Mass.,
442 U.S. 256 (1979), wherein the Court
held in order to establish that c1assbased discrimination existed under the
Equal Protection Clause, it must be
shown that a defendant chose or reaffirmed his course of action at least in
part because of its adverse effects on
the intended group. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at
760. The Court concluded that the
Feeney principle was applicable to the
"class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" requirement of § 1985(3)
because the Equal Protection Clause is
inherent in the class-based animus requirement. Moreover, it is particularly
applicable because the Court had previously held that the disfavoring of abortion was not "ipso facto" sex discrimination. ld. In so holding, the Court
rejected the validity ofthe second proposition.
The Court, in further attempting to define the scope of the Griffin
holding, next looked at the denotation
given to the words "invidiously" and
"discriminatory" in the context of
"there must be some racial or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Bray, 113 S. Ct.
at 761 (citing Gr@n,403 U.S. at 102).
The Court stated no matter what side of

the fence one falls on the goal behind, met because Pro-Life's opposition to
the demonstrations did not deserve the abortion did not even remotely correlate
harsh description and derogatory asso- to interstate travel. Rather, Operation
ciation which accompanies racism. ld. Rescue solely opposed the act of aborTo hold that it did, the Court stated, tion, and it was irrelevant to them
would be contrary to its previous hold- whether the abortion was performed
ing that electing childbirth over abor- after interstate travel. ld. at 763.
Moreover, the Court also retion was proper and asensible reason to
warrant the allocation of public funds. jected Pro-Choice's constitution violaSee Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474. tion argument for a second, indepenThis proposition would also further con- dent reason. ld. The Court recognized
flict with Congress' discrimination of that the constitutional right of interstate
abortion through its refusal to provide travel does not transforn1 a state tort
financial support to women seeking into a federal offense simply because
abortions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 the act was directed against interstate
U.S. 297,325. Bray, 113 S. C1. at 762. travelers. Furthermore, the Court noted
Finding that Pro-Choice failed that the right to interstate travel proto meet the Gr~[fin animus requirement, tected travelers from the "erection of
the Court addressed the second element actual barriers" and "being treated difof proving a § 1985(3) claim. The ferently" when traveling across state
Court stated that in order to succeed on lines. ld. In applying the aforemena § 1985(3) private conspiracy claim, tioned, the Court found the only barrier
the claimant must prove that there was to movement as a result of the demonan intent to deprive a person of a right strations was at the abortion clinics
guaranteed against private impairment. which it concluded hindered exclusively
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762 (citingCarpen- intrastate travel. Jd. As such, the Court
ters, 463 U.S. at 883). The Court held stated unless the restrictions were apthat no such motive existed for Opera- plied in a discriminating and intentional
tion Rescue's abortion protests. Bray, manner against citizens of other states
there was no infringement on women's
113 S. Ct. at 762.
In making its argument, Pro- right of interstate travel. Jd.
Choice relied upon the constitutional
Pro-Choice also contended that
right of interstate travel, which had in the demonstrations infringed upon a
some contexts been held to be protected woman's right to abortion. Jd. at 764.
against private interference, as grounds While the Court recognized that the
for establishing the existence of a § right of abortion was undoubtedly
1985(3) private conspiracy. The Court "aimed at" by the demonstrations, the
held the fact that a considerable amount Court refused to acknowledge that a §
of women travel across state lines to 1985 (3) claim existed. The Cou rt based
obtain an abortion, did not alone estab- its conclusion on its previous holding
lish a connection between the demon- that § 1985(3) did not apply to private
strations and a woman's constitutional conspiracies which were "aimed at" a
right to interstate travel. Bray, 113 S. right protected solely against state inCt. at 762. Drawing upon the "invidi- terference. Instead that section applied
ously discriminatory animus" require- only to conspiracies which were aimed
ment of Griffin, the Court created a at rights protected against private, as
requirement for establishing a con- well as official, interference. ld. In so
spiracy. The claimant must prove that holding, the Court noted there are only
a person's actions were "aimed at,"
a handful of rights which are protected
and not merely incidentally affecting a from both private and official interferperson's constitutionally protected right. ence, such as the Thirteenth AmendJd. In this case, the Court held this ment rights of interstate travel and freerequirement was not met. In fact, the dom from enslavement. As such, the
requirement could not conceivably be Court refused to add the right of abor-
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tion'to that exclusive list especially in
light of its earlier unwillingness to include the more explicitly protected constitutional right of free speech. Id.
In Bray, the United States Supreme Court clarified its current position on abortion and in so doing, rejected Pro-Choice's latest attempt to
permanently enjoin Pro-Life demonstrators from blocking the entrances to abortion clinics. The Court found there was
no latent conspiracy against women as
a class behind the demonstrations, and
further refused to recognize that a
woman's constitutionally protected
right of interstate travel was infringed
upon by such demonstrations. While
this decision is an apparent victory for
Operation Rescu~, the full impact of
this decision may never materialize given
the two recent shootings that injured
one abortion doctor and killed another,
coupled with the retirement of Justice
White, who joined the majority in this
opinion.

- John M Oliveri
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Georgia v. McCollum: CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS MAY NOT USE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
TO DISCRIMINATE ON THE
BASIS OF RACE.

Court stressed the importance of public
trust in the judicial system to maintain
peace in the community, especially in
race-related cases. McCollum, 112 S.
Ct. at 2354. Whether the discrimination was exercised by the State or the
In Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. defense, the Court concluded that the
Ct. 2348 (1992), the United States Su- resulting antagonistic feelings towards
preme Court held that defendants in the justice system were the same. Id.
criminal cases may not use peremptory
The Court next addressed whether
challenges to discriminate against po- the use of peremptory challenges by
tentialjurors on the. basis ?frace. In so criminal defendants constituted state
ruling, the Court expanded its prohibi- action under the Equal Protection
tion of racially discriminatory uses of Clause, because state action is required
peremptory strikes beyond the State under the Fourteenth Amendment in
and private litigants to encompass crimi- order to give rise to a Constitutional
na defendants.
violation. Id. The Court first looked to
On August 10, 1990, two caucasian its analysis in Edmonson v. Leesville
defendants were charged with the ag- Concrete Co., III S. Ct. 2082 (1991),
gravated assault and simple battery of which inquired into whether strikes arose
two African-Americans. Prior to jury from a right or privilege of state authorselection, the prosecutor moved to pro- ity. McCollum, 112 S. C1. at 2354.
hibit the respondents from using pe- Observing that both the right to exerremptory challenges to discriminate cise the strikes and their scope were
against potential African-Americanju- defined by state law, the Court deterrors. Both the trial court and the Su- mined that the use of peremptory chalpreme Court of Georgia concluded that lenges was a state right or privilege. Id.
criminal defendants, unlike civil liti- at 2355.
gants and criminal prosecutors, were
The Court next considered whether
pennitted to exercise peremptory strikes the defendants could be viewed as state
to racially discriminate, and thus keep actors, so that their actions would be
African-Americans from serving on the considered state actions under the Equal
jury. The United States Supreme Court Protection Clause. Id. The Court utigranted certiorari to consider whether lized the three prong analysis estabthe prohibition against using peremp- lished in Edmonson which examined
tory strikes in a racially discriminatory the following: (1) the extent to which
manner applied to criminal defendants, the actor relied on governmental assisas well as to the State and civil litigants. tance and benefits, (2) whether the actor
The Court began its analysis by was performing a traditional governconsidering whether such use of pe- mental function, and (3) whether the
remptory challenges by criminal defen- inju ry caused was aggravated in a unique
dants inflicts the same harm on the juror way by the incidents of governmental
and the conmmnity discussed in the authority. Id. (citing Edmonson, IllS.
Batson prohibition on discriminatory Ct. at 2083).
peremptory challenges by the prosecuConcluding that the defendants were
tion. Id. at 2353 (citing Batson v. state actors, the Court applied the three
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986». In prong test and noted that the criminal
concluding that similar harm would arise defendants had substantially relied on
from the use of racially discriminatory governmental assistance and benefits.
peremptory strikes by criminal defen- McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355. In
dants, the Court noted that public dis- addition, the pervasive nature of the
crimination undermines public confi- government's involrement in jury sedence in the courts and the system as a lection through state statutes enabled
whole. Id. at 2354. Furthermore, the the peremptory challenge system to ex-

